InstitutPersonenverzeichnis
Prof. Dr. Mathias Frisch

Prof. Dr. Mathias Frisch

Photo von Mathias Frisch Photo von Mathias Frisch
Prof. Dr. Mathias Frisch
Sprechzeiten
Mo., 12:00-13:00 Uhr, in der vorlesungsfreien Zeit nach Vereinbarung per Email
Adresse
Im Moore 21
30167 Hannover
Gebäude
Raum
Photo von Mathias Frisch Photo von Mathias Frisch
Prof. Dr. Mathias Frisch
Sprechzeiten
Mo., 12:00-13:00 Uhr, in der vorlesungsfreien Zeit nach Vereinbarung per Email
Adresse
Im Moore 21
30167 Hannover
Gebäude
Raum
Funktionen
Geschäftsführende Leitung
Institut für Philosophie
Vorstand
Institut für Philosophie
Vertr. d. Professorinnen/Professoren
Auswahlkommission Masterstudiengang Philosophy of Science
Stellv. d. Professorinnen/Professoren
Masterstudiengang Philosophy of Science
Professorinnen/Professoren
Mitarbeiter/-innen des Institut für Philosophie

PROFIL

Mathias Frisch studierte Philosophie und Physik an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und an der University of California in Berkeley.  Nach seinem Weggang aus München erwarb er in Berkeley zunächst einen Bachelor of Arts (1990) und einen Masters of Arts (1992) in Physik und promovierte danach in Philosophie (PhD 1998) zur Rolle von Modellen in naturwissenschaftlichen Erklärungen. 

Von 1998 bis 2003 war er als "Assistant Professor" an der Northwestern University angestellt.  Von 2003 bis 2015 war er an der University of Maryland tätig, seit Herbst 2013 als "Full Professor".  Von 2011 bis 2013 war Mathias Frisch zu Gast am Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy an der LMU, wo er seitdem Permanent Visiting Professor ist.  Seit 2008 ist er Research Associate am Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences der London School of Economics.  Seit Februar 2016 hat Mathias Frisch die Professur für theoretische Philosophie, insbesondere Wissenschaftsphilosophie, an der Leibniz Universität Hannover inne.

SCHWERPUNKTE IN FORSCHUNG UND LEHRE

  • Allgemeine Wissenschaftsphilosophie

  • Philosophie der Physik

  • Philosophie und Klimawandel

  • Publikationen

    Monographien

    2014

    Causal Reasoning in Physics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    2003

    Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality:  A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics, New York: Oxford University Press 

    Artikel in begutachteten Zeitschriften

    2017 "Climate Policy in the Age of Trump", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Volume 27, 2 Supplement, June (2017), E87-E106.

    2016

    “Reassessing the Ritz-Einstein debate on the radiation asymmetry in classical electrodynamics" Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics  55. 13-23.

    2015 "Book Symposium on Causal Reasoning in Physics: Replies to my critics." Metascience, November Volume 24, Issue 3, (2015). pp 366-372.
    2015 “Tuning climate models, predictivism, and the problem of old evidence.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science  5:2 (May 2015). 171-190.

    2015

    “Users, Structures, and Representations” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66:2, 285-306. 

    2014

    “Models and Scientific Representation or: who is Afraid of Inconsistency?” Synthese Vol. 191, 13 (2014). 3027-3040.

    2014

    “Laws in Physics”, European Review 22, Suppl. S1, 33-S49. 

    2014

    “Physics and the Human Face of Causation,” Topoi 33, 2, 407-419. DOI 10.1007/s11245-013-9172-0. 

    2013

    “Classical Electrodynamics:  no more toils and troubles?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics  44, 4, 527-531. 

    2012 “Modeling Climate Policies: A Critical Look at Integrated Assessment Models”, Philosophy and Technology 26 (2013). 117-137.
    2012 “Climate Change Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (Summer 2012). 225-253.

    2012

    “No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Physics." European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2:3, 313-336.

    2011

    “From Boltzmann to Arbuthnot: higher-level laws and the Best System,” Philosophy of Science 78, 1001-1011. 

    2011

    “Principle or Constructive Relativity?” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42, 176-183. 

    2010

    “Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88/4 , 655 – 672. 

    2009

    “Causality and dispersion: a reply to John Norton,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60, 487-495. 

    2009

    “‘The most Sacred Tenet’? Causal Reasoning in Physics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60, 459-474. 

    2009

    “Philosophical Issues in Electromagnetism,” Philosophy Compass 4/1, 255–270. 

    2008

    “Conceptual Problems in Classical Electrodynamics,” Philosophy of Science 75:1, 93-105. 

    2006

    “A Tale of Two Arrows,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 37, 542-558. 

    2005

    “Counterfactuals and the Past Hypothesis,” Philosophy of Science 72:5, 739–750. 

    2005

    “Mechanisms, Principles, and Lorentz’s Cautious Realism,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36:4, 659-679. 

    2004

    “Laws and Initial Conditions,” Philosophy of Science 71:5, 696-706 

    2004

    “Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics,” Philosophy of Science 71, 525-549. 

    2002

    “Non-Locality in Classical Electrodynamics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1-19. 

    2000

    “(Dis-)Solving the Puzzle of the Arrow of Radiation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, 381-410 

    1999

     “Van Fraassen’s Dissolution of Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument,” Philosophy of Science, 66, 158-164.

    Artikel in herausgegebenen Bänden

    In Kürze erscheinend "Causal Explanation", in Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, eds. Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson (forthcoming).
    In Kürze erscheinend “Uncertainty and Values in climate policy optimization models,” in Winsberg, E. and Lloyd, E., eds., Conceptual Foundations of Climate Modeling, The University of Chicago Press (forthcoming).

    In Kürze erscheinend

    “Statistical mechanics and the asymmetry of causal influence,” in David Albert’s Time and Chance, eds. Barry Loewer, Eric Winsberg, and Brad Weslake, Harvard University Press (forthcoming). 

    2019 “Calibration, Validation, and Confirmation” in C. Beisbart and N. J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation, Simulation Foundations, Methods and Applications. Springer (2019).
    2018 “Modeling Climate Policies: The Social Cost of Carbon and Uncertainties in ClimatePredictions” in Winsberg, E. and Lloyd, E., eds., Climate Modeling: Philosophical and Conceptual Issues, Palgrave-MacMillan (2018).

    2014

    “Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: a Reply to Beisbart” together with Luke Glynn, Radin Dardashti, and Karim Theabault in New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, eds. M. Galavotti, et al. (2014). 531-542. 

    2014

    “Why Physics Can’t Explain Everything,” in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, ed. Alastair Wilson, Oxford University Press (2014), 221-240. 

    2013

    “Time and Causation,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, eds. Heather Dykes and Adrian Bardon. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (2013), 282-300. 

    2012

    “Kausalität in der Physik,” (“Causality in Physics”) in Philosophie der Physik, ed. Michael Esfeld, Suhrkamp (2012). 

    2010

    “Causal Models and the Asymmetry of State Preparation” in EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, eds. M. Suárez, M. Dorato and M. Rédei. Springer Verlag (2010). 

    2010

    “Does a low-Entropy constraint prevent us from influencing the Past?,” in Time, Chance, and Reduction, eds. Andreas Hüttemann and Gerhard Ernst, Cambridge University Press (2010), 13-33. 

    2007

    “Causation, Counterfactuals and Entropy,” in Russell's Republic: The Place of Causation in the Constitution of Reality, eds. Huw Price and Richard Corry, Oxford University Press (2007), 351-395. 

    2007

    “A New Look at Popper’s Pond,” in Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, ed. Ian Jarvie, Ashgate (2007), 77-84.