It is a pleasure to commend my Professor Bill's paper because it is part of the

Paul Hovning-Nielsen

Commentary on Bill's Paper
of world change, let us try not to presuppose philosophical positions like realism or non-realism. Instead, let us reconstruct what the world views are before and after the revolution. After consideration of several such cases of incommensurability, let us ask the following question: Given that our epistemic position as analysts of scientific change is not fundamentally different from the epistemic position of the scientific subjects investigated, are these cases of world change compatible with a plausible realist position? Speaking for myself, I may state that at least my confidence in any form of realism is seriously undermined by this experience, and it is my impression that many competent historians feel the same. Of course, these are not decisive arguments, but this way of looking at the situation may open up a discussion in which many seem to be too sure of their own position.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Eric Oberheim for bringing the references in note 3 to my attention and for stylistic improvements.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


PART 2

INCOMMENSURABILITY
IN A WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE:
HOW TO MAKE SENSE OF NONSENSE